Ted Kennedy should not have made the statement that the Clinton policy was indeed regime change “but not by war.” Clinton’s intense bombing of Iraq during “Desert Fox” was certainly war, even though it did include ground troops. [It was, in fact, a prelude to the strategy of Kosovo three months later.] As a matter of fact Clinton continued the bombing defense installations for months even after the official four days of intensity. All through his terms he kept up the defense of the no-fly zone, along with supporting the Kurds against Turkey incursions. In a sense, then, just as Clinton inherited the so-called cease fire agreement with Iraq from the first George Bush, George W inherited the continuing attacks on Iraq from Clinton.


In light of Clinton’s own belief that Saddam would continue “to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction” his blunder as commander-in-chief was in not continuing the intensity of “Desert Fox” in order to render the thuggery of the regime totally vulnerable as Gen Zinnia, of Mideast Command, expected, waiting in the wings to assist the provinces in a take over. George W’s blunder was at the outset in adopting the UN’s ineffectual “smart sanctions,” rather than to pump up “Desert Fox,” and by so doing avoid all brouhaha of “preemptive” strike. It is true that Zinnia’s strategy would have necessitated strategic special forces — not to mention smart air support — on the ground in Iraq but much like the Afghanistan operation with help from the millions opposed to the regime by unleashing the Kurds against any insurgents in the triangle left over from punishing air strikes — and not unlike the help George Herbert promised the Shi`a’s uprising had he followed through.


Had George W. Bush capitalized on this smart strategy, he would not be in the current predicament. Clinton showed him how to do what his own indecisiveness prevented in ‘98, yet showed decisiveness in the ’99 Kosovo war and indicative of misplaced priorities, in spite of the immediacy of the Kosovars’ quandary.


   Copyright © 2004 Richard R. Kennedy All rights reserved. Revised: February 11, 2004.