The concern over the voting integrity of electronic systems is totally misdirected by emphasizing a “paper trail” which is only going to mirror the glitches of the system. It is true, as anyone who uses a computer knows and continually badgered, backing up your input is imperative but it does not guarantee that the back up will be any different from the original. The same applies to printing out your data — if you don’t proof your input the errors remain.
The solution to the problem is misdirected because the issue is for homeland security intelligence, including the FBI and local police, to safeguard against electronic terrorism, which if it did not exist, the better solution is to have voting done on a home or public computer and recorded directly to the appropriate county election district. Even then election officers who have not had a security and competency check could unleash havoc. Nationwide a third of the votes cast in November will be paperless direct-recording electronic voting [DRE] similar to the ATM machine with the exception of a receipt. However, DRE displays an image of your vote results and a chance to correct before casting. Unless the machine is entirely screwed up, a voter can safely trust the vote has been cast correctly, just as in any other system. In my younger and middle years, I voted in New York by way of turn-of-the-20th century lever machines and trusted my vote was duly registered. That is about all any citizen can expect give or take the margin of error, along with the hope that the number of unscrupulous officials was minimal.
Of course, there is comfort in the event of a crash to have a back up but that will only confirm data before the disaster, resulting in partial salvage and gibberish after whether on a hard drive or print-out. Where homeland security role enters is at the manufacturing of the systems by screening employers and employees, together with quality control of hardware, mandating relatively fool-proof back up restoring the integrity of the system, and extensive testing of software. In addition, there should be scrutiny of local officials to assure there is no collusion in the bidding process for an inferior product, together with overseeing the training of election officers.
In a way, the paranoia of the 2000 election is a good thing in that it has made us conscious of every vote should count as far as is possible — but as every computer user knows there still exists anxious moments when a system freezes. Yet is no more likely than a voter pushing the wrong button or penciling the wrong bubble.
Copyright © 2004 Richard R. Kennedy All rights reserved. Revised: August, 5, 2004.