The message that Abu Ghraib prison scandal sends is primarily the revulsion Americans and the rest of the world have in common, from appalling to Un-American. A more important issue, however, is the current system of the Army foremost and the authoritarian love affair Americans have with the armed services that can do no wrong. Since the first Gulf War it has been spoon-fed by politicians extolling — particularly the Army’s — virtues and extraordinary specialization in its deft strategies even to the extent that Colin Powell called it the greatest fighting force the world has ever known — tantamount to a sports writer hailing Joe Louis as the greatest after defeating a fat bartender, during Louis’ “bum of the month” tour of easy victories.
The glaring fact is that the US forces have not been legitimately tested since the Vietnam War; all skirmishes since have been “cake walks.” Even the air force, magnificent though it be, has not seen a real dogfight in thirty-five years. There is, however, no question that the Army and Marines, as well as the British forces, were effective in their initial invasion of Iraq, having met little resistance, resembling but pockets of resistance others had experienced in the aftermath of extremely bloody wars. Moreover, the light combat was deceptive because much of the potential resistance was bypassed, presenting a lethal potential behind the lines or those ahead — such as the Triangle — more or less ignored. Still, the troops did “take” but not secure Baghdad within a number of days with a minimum of casualties, less than 100 dead — contrast that with Tarawa’s 1000 Marines in three days — and America, and for a time Iraqis, danced on the euphoric settling smoke . Either way war is hell: to the family of a dead hero or heroine it is no consolation that he or she was only one of a “mere” 100.
Because of this unwarranted propaganda spread across our nation of the invincibility of US troops, America was slow in recognizing the horrors of war, particularly when in failing to perceive it as a political war, much like Vietnam on a smaller scale yet just as intense. There is a vast difference in the Congressional mandate for “regime change” — in hoping that somehow there is a transfer of power from Saddam to more reasonable Iraqi leaders — and that of accomplishing change by invasion. In war it is not merely “change” but “regime crush” until there is a no-nonsense formal surrender and cessation of hostilities. What makes this a political war is the theme to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis and therefore they were not crushed and humbled, but liberated. Vietnamese didn’t buy into liberation nor do the Iraqis because of the inevitable bullying ambience of a free-wheeling occupation lacking purposeful action while thousands of insurgents are free to wreak havoc on the country.
The insurgency rightly ticked off the American troops, especially what once was thought of as “cake walk” has rudely generated more and more American casualties. Well-trained military police company attached to a legitimate army division or battalion, is not totally disinclined to harsh treatment of prisoners whom they are capable of shrewdly culling out murderous bastards from the droves caught up in the panic. What they would do to these hardened insurgents is not even the business of Geneva because they have enough smarts not to leave evidence lying around. Illegitimate military police, such as the 372nd MP Company, trained for occasional stateside uprisings or drunken brawls, should not have been there in the first place; for they do not have the necessary military discipline and nuance as does an MP attachment to a fighting force.
This is the larger scandal: The Army relies too heavily on poorly conditioned weekend warriors of an ostensibly self-sustaining unit. This is the crucial mistake the Army makes. Putting aside the wisdom of the draft — insuring diversity and talent — the army, instead of falling back on state reserves as units unto themselves, when the skirmishes thicken and casualties mount, individual state reservists should be absorbed into a legitimate fighting unit as the need for replacements arises. In battles or any other duty they should be under command of a unit of seasoned officers and non-coms, not left to some dentist and McDonald’s burger flipper who humbly acknowledge they are out of their league. On the other hand, previously discharged unattached reservists on call and subsequently assigned to their old unit or one comparable can refresh their skills quickly, having had previous military experience. These legitimate reservists are heads and shoulders above a provincial state militia — war is not an intrastate collegiate game vying for a state championship.
If the arrogance of the professional top brass would go back to the drawing board of real wars, they might begin to understand there is no compromise when combat and related serious duty are at stake. I personally know how effective this process of replacements works. When an infantry platoon of forty is down to ten, it welcomes rear echelon cooks and truck drivers — and yes, those rushed out of boot camp — to fill the empty foxholes. And, believe me, guided by seasoned fighters, they learn the ropes quickly and effectively.
Copyright © 2004 Richard R. Kennedy All rights reserved. Revised: May 15, 2004.