There is scarcely any certainty in the world. The best that can be expected is the mental impressions upon things an events. When we infer that Saddam is Saddam [S=S] there is certainty since the subject and predicate are the same. When we state S=M, the predicate adds to the subject, even though the subject itself is not changed: Saddam is a Murderer. However, the statement is an assertion and not true unless followed with contingent predicates or sufficient reasons, such as evidenced by the unearthing of mass graves proven to be the result of S’s direct decree as plausible as his ordering the gassing of the Kurds. So, too, with O=O modified by the same predicate and further contingencies such as Osama’s video tape showing his euphoria over the total destruction of the twin towers exceeding his wildest expectations, and the admission that his destructive cells were great martyrs. These examples eradicate uncertainty because of unadulterated display of their deeds.

There are other impressions that are not as fool-proof, such as WMD in Iraq, or its imminent threat. Here sufficient reasoning must be accompanied by fact, not hearsay or undocumented opining. For instance, when the Japanese fleet escaped the radar screen of the US Navy the event had really no significance since “peace talks” were underway in Washington. Although intelligence in D.C. knew hours before of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, it arrived at Hawaii too late. Had it been known beforehand, a preemptive attack or at least defensive deployment by the US would have certainly been enacted based on sufficient reason. In Iraq’s case, had “containment’ not been in effect for twelve years and Saddam unhindered, reports of WMD could very well have been “sufficient reason,” together with troop build up in the no-fly zones, to muster a preemptive strike of any kind. On September 11^th, had belated intelligence uncovered the attack in flight and its clear intent, sufficient reason would have dictated the agonizing decision to shoot down the planes even though fatal to the hundreds of innocence aboard. Ideally had intelligence uncovered the plot hours before and alerted FAA to shut down all flights and might have led to the arrest of the nineteen combatants.

It is not enough to base decisions on simplistic entries such as A is A and therefore B without the safeguards of C. To entertain a strategy of defense against terror on unverified “chatter” or advice of “urgency” is not sufficient reason, yet it surely is sufficient for an alert — D=S [defense requires surveillance] and if coupled with insufficient reason, it must nevertheless raise the red flag in virtue of the plausibility of terrorism having no boundaries whether abroad or domestic. Columbine terrorism, for instance, was sufficiently loaded with warnings of impending threat that was grossly ignored.

Toward Certainty

In politics, too, there is uncertainty in propositions of deception. In a republic, individuals are free under conditions of rightful law. Law to be carried out is a service requiring taxation by representation. Representation is the will of the majority, which nevertheless must protect and nurture the freedom of all individuals under the law of the land if it is to exercise justice. Justice is apportionment of fairness to all members under the law of the land.

Any departure from the following propositions are false:

1) Government to function requires levying of taxes. [In a non-republic this could be extortion; in a republic it is by necessary consent.]

2) Taxes are necessarily drawn from the wealth and paid labor of the people. [In a non-republic this is drawn primarily from those least able to pay and only from the wealthy when necessary; in a republic, levying begins at the top or those most able to pay because they have the most to gain from the protective law of the land.]

3) Governance by and for a free people must necessarily be virtuous in light of an unqualified duty to sustain the good will of freedom under law; virtue is alien to totalitarian governance since it has no mandate to be righteous.

4) Good will in all endeavors is the essential attribute of a republic’s governance, without which there can be no general will toward common good. [Even in war there is good will when it is driven, without any deceptive appendage, by a clear and imminent threat to the republic.]

5) The common good requires good will among the people as well; there can be no deceptive practice on the part of individuals designed to upset the equilibrium of common goals of religious tolerance, economic well-being, fair trade, inventiveness and opportunity, availability of health and education, lobbies for other selfless niches of the commonwealth. [Welfare in common, for instance, is not designed to be charitable but as investment in the development of citizenry of good will to accommodate, thereby contributing to, the common good.]

Therefore, devious practice of the above propositions are false:

1) To protest the necessity for taxation, particularly federal other than national defense, is germinated by the idea that it is simply extortion equated with mafia style fees for protection, which is bogus since the NRA insists that each individual is qualified to keep the peace, and all services are subject to individuated purchase.

This, needless to say, defies the necessity of basic goods and services in common and tends to disrupt the necessary balance of equal rights and protection for all.

2) To contest the affordability basis for taxation reflecting good will: taxes should be based on per-capita costs and evenly divided to prevent redistribution of assets to preserve the myth of common good.

Affordability is predicated on the relative percentage of the excess of what constitutes the basics to survive, together with the necessary costs of government to maintain and enrich the commonwealth, which to have any meaning, entails redistribution as a necessary attribute in order to enhance the enlightenment and health of the entire citizenry and to preclude the perpetuity of dynastic aristocracies that cross the grains of a republic.

3) It is not the business of government to be virtuous but simply functional in the realistic field of practice that leans to pragmatic vice.

On the contrary, virtue in governance must be prioritized in order to pursue, maintain and enhance freedom under law and to set the example for citizenship, indivisible and with cognizance of justice for all.

4) Good will is idealistic nonsense and does not reflect the besmirched reality of politics. The categorical imperative of “what’s in it for me and limited constituents” should be programed as universal law.

Refuting good will undermines by definition the pursuit of the common good, which also by definition entails good will toward all who are deserving and the undeserving who are capable of healthful potential, which incontrast to above, Kant’s categorical imperative wills by a higher moral maxim in that it becomes universal legislation.

5) People possess free will, of which good will is but an after thought, and might or might not have propitious consequences. Those of free will have no qualms about the outcome of Iraq — all are at risk.

On the contrary, free will is predicated on virtuous governance sustaining the good will of freedom under law. Therefore, free will without good will is unlawful. The free will of unilateral action overrides the good will of regime change or national defense by rendering the outcome of good to chance, rather than out of sufficient reason and contingencies to stand the test of a universal act.

Copyright © 2004 Richard R. Kennedy All rights reserved. Revised: April 20, 2004